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To Waive or Not to Waive? Filing Deadlines and 
Hearing Requests in Administrative Adjudications 
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“I’m late! I’m late! For a very important date! No time to say 
hello, goodbye! I’m late! I’m late! I’m late!” – The White Rabbit, 
Alice in Wonderland 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A person who has filed a late request for a contested case hearing 
might have as much reason to panic as the White Rabbit. While they 
won’t lose their head, they may have waived their right to that 
hearing.1  
State and federal administrative agencies exercise a variety of 
important functions, which may include the authority to hold “quasi-
judicial” hearings.2 Such administrative adjudications are generally in 
                                                            
* Alice Booher Johnson is a staff attorney at the Maryland Office of 
Administrative Hearings. The author would like to thank Administrative Law 
Judges Henry Abrams and Mary Shock of the Maryland Office of Administrative 
Hearings for their insightful questions and analyses, which provided the inspiration 
for this Article. The author would also like to thank Denise Shaffer, Executive 
Administrative Law Judge and Deputy Director of Operations, and Georgia Brady, 
Executive Administrative Law Judge and Deputy Director of Quality Assurance, 
for their encouragement and support for this Article. 
 See, e.g., ARNOLD ROCHVARG, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF MARYLAND 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 10.1, at 121 (2011) (“Failure to request a hearing in a 
timely fashion will mean that the right to a contested case hearing . . . has been 
waived.”).  
 See, e.g., Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 292 U.S. 602, 628 (1935) 
(explaining that the Federal Trade Commission, an “administrative body created by 
Congress,” exercises an executive function “in the discharge and effectuation of its 
quasi legislative or quasi judicial powers.”). In Maryland, the Court of Appeals has 
emphasized that the “judicial function” may only be exercised by courts 
enumerated in the Maryland Constitution. Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor of 
Assessments of Prince George’s Cty., 343 A.2d 521, 526 (Md. 1975). While the 
“[l]egislature may within limits delegate quasi-judicial functions to an 
administrative agency . . . the delegation of these functions is not the delegation of 
a judicial function or judicial authority.” Id. at 527 (emphasis added). Contra 1 
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.3, at 47 (5th ed. 
2010) (“Agencies, both pure Executive Branch and independent, make legislative 
rules based on agency policy decisions virtually every day. Agencies of both types 
execute the laws in every conceivable sense of the word. Agencies also adjudicate 
far more disputes involving individual rights than all of the federal courts 
combined—a function that would seem to bear most comfortably the label 
‘judicial.’”). See also Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: 
 
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the form of a “contested case” hearing, which has been defined as a 
“formal evidentiary adversarial hearing.”3 These evidentiary hearings 
often provide certain “flexible” procedural due process safeguards.4 
While the nature of a filing deadline for a contested case hearing 
might seem to be a fundamental aspect of due process in an 
administrative adjudication, authoritative guidance on the subject—at 
least among the states—is sparse and contradictory. 
Courts have long addressed filing deadlines outside of contested 
case hearings,5 more recently in the context of whether a reviewing 
                                                            
Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 579 (1984) 
(noting that “describing what the agencies do as ‘quasi-adjudication’ or ‘quasi-
legislation’” obscures, rather than answers, questions on the “forbidden conjoining 
of powers” between the three branches of government). 
 Lunde v. Iowa Bd. of Regents, 487 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992). 
Maryland’s APA defines a “contested case” as a “proceeding before an agency to 
determine . . . a right, duty, statutory entitlement, or privilege of a person . . . or the 
grant, denial, renewal, revocation, suspension, or amendment of a license, that is 
required by statute or constitution to be determined only after an opportunity for an 
agency hearing.” MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10-202(d)(1) (West 2014). See 
also REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 401 (Nat’l Conference of 
Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 2010) (“This [article] applies to an adjudication 
made by an agency in a contested case.”). 
 See generally Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260-62, 267 (1970) (setting 
forth due process standards in the termination of “statutory entitlements” and 
reiterating that the “fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity 
to be heard”); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 349 (1976) (highlighting 
that due process is “flexible” and holding that an “evidentiary hearing is not 
required prior to the termination of disability benefits”); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. 
Lytle, 821 A.2d 62, 69-70 (Md. 2003) (explaining that due process procedures are 
determined by “balancing the individual and governmental interests affected by the 
property deprivation”). See also Bernard Schwartz, A Decade of Administrative 
Law: 1987-1996, 32 TULSA L.J. 493, 524 (1997) (arguing that “courts must be 
vigilant in ensuring that flexible due process does not result in dilution of due 
process”); Edward A. Tomlinson, The Maryland Administrative Procedure Act: 
Forty Years Old in 1997, 56 MD. L. REV. 196, 251 (1997) (“The contested case 
model has proved workable in Maryland, despite the breadth of adjudication 
covered. . . . The OAH in particular has adopted ‘flexible due process’ as its basic 
credo.”).   
 See, e.g., E. King Poor, The Jurisdictional Time Limit for an Appeal: The 
Worst Kind of Deadline—Except for All Others, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 
151, 154 (2008) (“[T]he debate about jurisdictional deadlines . . . is really quite old. 
Thousands of reported decisions, reaching back to the 1840s, have concluded that a 
small group of deadlines—chief among them the time to appeal—are jurisdictional 
 
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court exercises original6 or appellate7 jurisdiction. In Part II of this 
Article, I provide an overview of subject matter jurisdiction in 
relation to filing timeframes. I review the distinction between original 
and appellate jurisdiction using Maryland case law and a sample 
survey of other state case law to provide background to the question 
of filing deadlines and hearing requests in administrative 
adjudications. Generally, a statutory filing deadline in a court of 
original jurisdiction is construed as a statute of limitations, which 
may be waived or equitably tolled or estopped under certain 
conditions.8 If, on the other hand, a filing timeframe is part of a 
court’s jurisdiction—such as an appeal to a court with appellate 
jurisdiction—then an untimely filing may not be waived by a party or 
granted an exception by the court under equitable principles.9 State 
                                                            
or ‘jurisdictional in nature,’ and thus cannot be altered by the parties or ignored by 
the courts.”). 
 Original jurisdiction has been defined as “[a] court’s power to hear and 
decide a matter before any other court can review the matter.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 982 (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added).  
  Appellate jurisdiction has been defined as “[t]he power of a court to review 
and revise a lower court’s decision.” Id. at 980 (emphasis added); see also Shell Oil 
Co., 343 A.2d at 525 (“[A]ppellate jurisdiction does not arise until there is an initial 
exercise of judicial power or authority by a court.” (emphasis added)). 
! See, e.g., Poor, supra note 5, at 202 n.132 (“Statutory filing deadlines are 
generally subject to the defenses of waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.”); 
People v. Keegan, 779 N.E.2d 904, 905-06 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (stating that 
“[o]rdinary statutes of limitation present procedural bars that may be asserted as an 
affirmative defense or waived” and holding that the filing period for a hearing in 
the circuit court with original jurisdiction under the State’s constitution is “an 
ordinary statute of limitations . . . that [can be] waived by the State”). 
" See, e.g., Kim v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 714 A.2d 176, 179 (Md. 1998) 
(“[T]his Court has repeatedly emphasized that an action for judicial review of an 
administrative decision is an original action. It is not an appeal. . . . The time 
requirements for filing appeals are ordinarily treated as jurisdictional in nature. . . . 
[A]bsent a special statute or rule dealing with the matter . . . a prematurely filed 
appeal must be dismissed by an appellate court because the appellate court has no 
jurisdiction over the matter.”); Cooper v. Kirkwood Cmty. Coll., 782 N.W.2d 160, 
164 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010) (“On a petition for judicial review of an 
administrative agency decision ‘the district court does not exercise original 
jurisdiction vested in it by the constitution. It exercises appellate jurisdiction 
conferred upon it by statute.’” (citation omitted)). See generally Mark A. Hall, The 
Jurisdictional Nature of the Time to Appeal, 21 GA. L. REV. 399, 399-400 (1986) 
(arguing that “appeal periods are like original jurisdiction limitation periods; they 
 
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courts are far from uniform on whether the filing deadline in a 
reviewing court is a jurisdictional requirement that cannot be waived. 
Moreover, in the administrative context, the demarcation between 
original and appellate jurisdiction is of limited utility. 
In Part III of this Article, I elaborate upon Supreme Court 
precedent on administrative filing deadlines. Nearly thirty years ago, 
Professor Mark Hall commented that the federal courts “have made a 
fetish of their own authority by characterizing timing defects” in 
“appellate and quasi appellate time limitations” as “jurisdictional.”10 
The Supreme Court subsequently adopted an important bright line for 
determining whether to classify such statutory time limitations as 
jurisdictional.11 The Supreme Court characterizes filing deadlines—
including administrative appeal timeframes—as “quintessential 
claim-processing rules” that are not jurisdictional unless Congress 
clearly prescribes that a “procedural rule” is jurisdictional.12  
In Part IV of this Article, I analyze the nature of filing deadlines 
for hearing requests before various state agencies, with an emphasis 
on Maryland’s scheme. The case law among the states is limited and 
contradictory, which raises the question in Part V of how to proceed 
with an untimely filing. What emerges from my review of time 
limitations in state and Supreme Court cases is that whether a 
jurisdictional bar exists is often a question of legislative intent. 
Because of the harshness of jurisdictional deadlines, I recommend 
that the relevant agency statute and regulations be carefully parsed to 
determine if there is any flexibility in the filing deadline. I review 
“good cause” exceptions and the Accardi Doctrine and apply the 
foregoing principles to the filing timeframe in Maryland medical 
assistance cases, concluding that the regulatory deadline is an 
administrative statute of limitations. In summary, I urge the states, 
                                                            
involve primarily the interests of the immediate parties, not fundamental societal 
interests [and] should therefore be subject to waiver by the parties”).  
 Hall, supra note 9, at 399 & n.1, 401 (noting that the “attitude of the federal 
courts is representative of that in the state courts as well”). 
 Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 (2013). 
 Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 (2011); see also Jessica Berch, 
Waving Goodbye to Non-Waivability: The Case for Permitting Waiver of Statutory 
Subject Matter-Jurisdiction Defects, 45 MCGEORGE L. REV. 635, 639, 647-48 
(2014) (“The Supreme Court has concluded [that] time deadlines are generally not 
jurisdictional . . . .”). 
 
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especially under principles of flexible due process, to unmoor 
themselves from “jurisdictional” time limitations and follow the 
example of the Supreme Court in providing clarity and uniformity in 
the area of administrative filing deadlines. 
 
II. ORIGINAL AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
 
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
 
The timeframe in which to appeal is often couched in terms of 
subject matter jurisdiction: “[T]he inveterate rule that a timely appeal 
is jurisdictional is not limited to federal courts; it has long been a 
fundamental precept of state court jurisprudence as well.”13 Subject 
matter jurisdiction may be defined as “[j]urisdiction over the nature 
of the case and the type of relief sought.”14 Subject matter 
jurisdiction may not be waived, and defects in subject matter 
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage in the proceedings.15 These 
jurisdictional “appeals” are often understood as an appeal to a court 
with appellate jurisdiction; appellate jurisdiction has been defined in 
turn as “[t]he power of a court to review and revise a lower court’s 
decision.”16 Yet, appeals are far broader than a proceeding in an 
appellate court and may include any proceeding that is undertaken for 
the purpose of reconsideration by a higher authority, for example, the 
submission of an agency’s decision to a court for review.17 This 
distinction is important because while the appeal timeframe before a 
court with appellate jurisdiction may be a matter of subject matter 
jurisdiction, the appeal timeframe before a reviewing court with 
original jurisdiction might not implicate subject matter jurisdiction.  
                                                            
 Poor, supra note 5, at 154-55. 
 BLACK’S, supra note 6, at 983. 
 Berch, supra note 12, at 635, 638-39, 647-48 (2014) (“While other defects 
may be waived, subject-matter jurisdiction stands alone as the single unwaivable 
defect. . . . The Supreme Court . . . has struggled to define the boundaries of what 
constitutes subject-matter jurisdiction.”); see also Williams v. Comm’n on Human 
Rights & Opportunities, 777 A.2d 645, 651 (Conn. 2001) (“A conclusion that a 
time limit is subject matter jurisdictional has very serious and final 
consequences.”). 
 BLACK’S, supra note 6, at 982.  
  See id. at 117. 
 
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B. Reviewing Courts 
 
1. Maryland Case Law 
 
Appeal timeframes before the Maryland appellate courts are 
“jurisdictional in nature” and are not subject to waiver absent a 
special statute or rule. In Kim v. Comptroller,18 the Court of Appeals 
underscored the distinction between an original action (in a 
reviewing court with original jurisdiction) and an appeal before a 
court with appellate jurisdiction. Kim stated as follows:  
[T]his Court has repeatedly emphasized that an action for judicial 
review of an administrative decision is an original action. It is not an 
appeal. . . . The time requirements for filing appeals are ordinarily 
treated as jurisdictional in nature. . . . [A]bsent a special statute or 
rule dealing with the matter . . . a prematurely filed appeal must be 
dismissed by an appellate court because the appellate court has no 
jurisdiction over the matter. . . . The same cannot be said, however, 
of a prematurely filed petition for judicial review, because the time 
requirements for filing a petition for judicial review are not 
jurisdictional. It is in the nature of a statute of limitations.19   
The court took pains to clarify the terminology because there are 
significant consequences for a party if the time requirement is 
jurisdictional. The appellate court must dismiss a premature or late 
appeal; on the other hand, the circuit court will not bar a premature or 
late petition for judicial review (original action) if the statute of 
limitations defense was not raised in the defendant’s answer.20 Thus, 
Kim clarified that the nature of a filing timeframe depends upon 
whether the court exercises original or appellate jurisdiction. While 
Maryland’s highest court has provided certain parameters on the 
issue of timeframes and jurisdiction, it still leaves the adjudicating 
agency in “Wonderland” since the agency performs a “quasi-judicial” 
                                                            
! 714 A.2d 176 (Md. 1998). 
" Id. at 179-80 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
 Id.; see also State v. Sharfeldin, 854 A.2d 1208, 1214 (Md. 2004). 
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function and does not technically exercise original or appellate 
jurisdiction.21 
 
2. Sample Survey of Other State Case Law 
 
Many state courts have reviewed their constitutions and statutes 
to determine whether a timely filing or “appeal” in a reviewing court 
is a jurisdictional requirement that cannot be waived. While some 
courts hold that a timely filing is necessary to confer subject matter 
jurisdiction on the court, other courts hold that filing deadlines are 
flexible and not a jurisdictional prerequisite. 
In Iowa, the reviewing courts exercise appellate—rather than 
original— jurisdiction over petitions for judicial review of agency 
actions.22 In Cooper v. Kirkwood Community College, the Court of 
Appeals held that the plaintiff’s premature petition for judicial review 
of an administrative agency decision was a “jurisdictional defect” 
that could not be waived.23 Likewise, in Texas, while the Court of 
Appeals did not differentiate between original and appellate 
jurisdiction, it held that the statutory filing deadline under the Texas 
Labor Code for judicial review of a final agency decision was a 
“jurisdictional prerequisite” to the trial court’s review.24  
Illinois’ and Indiana’s appellate courts have also addressed 
statutory filing deadlines and “jurisdictional prerequisites” in the 
lower courts but concluded in certain cases that the filing period was 
either an “ordinary statute of limitations”25 or was “analogous to the 
                                                            
 In an earlier opinion, the Court of Appeals emphasized that since an 
administrative agency does not perform a judicial function (unless enumerated in 
the Maryland Constitution), it does not exercise original jurisdiction; therefore, 
review of the agency’s decision in the circuit court is an exercise of original rather 
than appellate jurisdiction. Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor of Assessments of Prince 
George’s Cty., 343 A.2d 521, 527 (Md. 1975). See also supra note 2. 
 Christiansen v. Iowa Bd. of Educ. Exam’rs, 831 N.W.2d 179, 186 (Iowa 
2013); see also Cooper v. Kirkwood Cmty. Coll., 782 N.W.2d 160, 164 n.1 (Iowa 
Ct. App. 2010) (“On a petition for judicial review of an administrative agency 
decision ‘the district court does not exercise original jurisdiction vested in it by the 
constitution. It exercises appellate jurisdiction conferred upon it by statute.’” 
(citation omitted)). 
 Cooper, 782 N.W.2d at 164 n.1, 167-68. 
 Stoker v. TWC Comm’rs, 402 S.W.3d 926, 929 (Tex. App. 2013). 
 People v. Keegan, 779 N.E.2d 904, 906 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). 
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statute of limitations.”26 In People v. Keegan, the Appellate Court of 
Illinois contrasted statutory “jurisdictional time limitations” for 
administrative review proceedings with statutes of limitations for 
other proceedings. Keegan cited to its supreme court, which 
explained that “except in the area of administrative review, the 
jurisdiction of the circuit court flows from the constitution.”27 The 
statutory filing period before the reviewing court was a jurisdictional 
prerequisite “[b]ecause the circuit court was exercising special 
statutory jurisdiction under the administrative review law.”28 The 
supreme court emphasized that labeling time limitations in statutory 
actions as “jurisdictional” is “not a rule of general applicability to all 
statutory causes of action.”29 Against this backdrop, Keegan held that 
in those cases where the circuit court had “original subject matter 
jurisdiction under [the] state’s constitution,” the filing period for a 
hearing “is an ordinary statute of limitations—not a jurisdictional 
prerequisite that could not be waived by the State.”30 
In Packard v. Shoopman, the Supreme Court of Indiana held that 
the timely filing of a petition for judicial review to the Tax Court is 
“analogous to [a] statute of limitations” and does not “affect the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the Tax Court.”31 Packard stated that 
the “timely filing of a complaint in the Tax Court is ‘jurisdictional’ 
only in the sense that it is a statutory prerequisite to the docketing of 
an appeal in the Tax Court” but acknowledged that “statutory 
‘jurisdictional’ requirements in other statutes may require a different 
result” depending upon the “nature of the court and the particular 
statutory language.”32  
In Rhode Island and Virginia, the appellate courts did not tether 
the statutory filing deadline for judicial review to subject matter 
jurisdiction. The plaintiff in McAninch v. State of Rhode Island 
Department of Training & Labor came before the Supreme Court of 
Rhode Island after the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s untimely 
                                                            
 Packard v. Shoopman, 852 N.E.2d 927, 932 (Ind. 2006). 
  Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 770 N.E.2d 177, 
185 (Ill. 2002). 
! Id. at 187. 
" Id. 
 Keegan, 779 N.E.2d at 906. 
 852 N.E.2d 927, 931-32 (Ind. 2006). 
 Id. at 931. 
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administrative appeal—finding it was “appellate in nature”—for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction.33 The court highlighted that “the real 
issue before the Superior Court was whether that tribunal, which 
unquestionably had subject matter jurisdiction, should have 
exercised that jurisdiction.”34 The court stated that while “[s]tatutes 
prescribing the time and procedure to be followed by a litigant 
attempting to secure appellate review are to be strictly construed,”35 
the “timeframes set forth in those statutes are [not] utterly 
inflexible.”36 The court found that the statutory timeframe for 
administrative review was guided by case law and court rules and, 
upon review of those sources, held that the superior court rules 
applied to the computation of time for the administrative appeal.37  
In Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Board of Zoning 
Appeals of Fairfax County, the Supreme Court of Virginia revisited 
the term “jurisdiction” in order to determine the nature of the filing 
timeframe for administrative review by the circuit court.38 The court 
elaborated that the “filing requirement set by the General Assembly 
does not define the class of cases, i.e. the subject matter jurisdiction, 
over which the circuit court has authority to adjudicate.”39 The court 
held that the filing timeframe was an “other jurisdictional element” 
subject to waiver if not properly raised.40  
This survey illustrates the variation among the state courts on the 
issue of the nature of filing deadlines in the reviewing courts. More 
specifically, these analyses highlight that statutory filing deadlines 
may not be inextricably intertwined with subject matter jurisdiction.  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
 64 A.3d 84, 86-87 (R.I. 2013). 
 Id. at 87 (quoting Narragansett Elect. Co. v. Saccoccio, 43 A.3d 40, 44 (R.I. 
2012)). 
 Id. at 88 (quoting Rivera v. Emps. Ret. Sys. of R.I., 70 A.3d 905, 912 (R.I. 
2013)). 
 Id.  
  Id. at 88- 90. 
! 626 S.E.2d 374, 378 (Va. 2006). 
" Id. at 379. 
 Id. at 381. 
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III. SUPREME COURT CASE LAW ON FILING DEADLINES 
 
Courts often reiterate that timely notice of an “appeal” is 
“mandatory and jurisdictional.”41 The time limits imposed under the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure have historically been 
interpreted as jurisdictional.42 Outside of traditional appeals from one 
court to another, however, the Supreme Court, in a series of cases, 
has made significant incursions into “jurisdictional” time 
limitations.43 
 
A. Scarborough v. Principi 
 
In Scarborough v. Principi, the Supreme Court examined the 
filing period in a provision under the Equal Access to Justice Act 
authorizing the payment of attorney fees to a prevailing party in an 
action against the United States.44 The Court began by clarifying that 
the timeframe for the fee award “does not concern the federal courts’ 
‘subject-matter jurisdiction.’”45 Although Scarborough addressed an 
application filing period rather than an appeal, the Court 
highlighted—citing its recent decision in Kontrick v. Ryan—the 
“more than occasional” misuse of the term “jurisdictional” to 
describe “emphatic time prescriptions” in rules.46  
 
 
                                                            
 Panhorst v. United States, 241 F.3d 367, 369-70 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 Id. at 371. 
 See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 558 U.S. 67, 
82 (2009) (stating that “we have reaffirmed the jurisdictional character of the time 
limitation for filing a notice of appeal” to a court of appeals but finding that 
“nothing in the [Railway Labor] Act elevates to jurisdictional status the obligation 
to conference minor disputes or to prove conferencing”). Id. at 80. 
 541 U.S. 401, 405 (2004). 
 Id. at 413. 
 Id. (quoting in part Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004)). Kontrick v. 
Ryan, written by Justice Ginsburg (who also wrote Scarborough), was a key case 
disentangling timeframes from subject matter jurisdiction. For a detailed history on 
jurisdictional deadlines, see E. King Poor, Jurisdictional Deadlines in the Wake of 
Kontrick and Eberhart: Harmonizing 160 Years of Precedent, 40 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 181 (2007).  
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B. Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Engineers 
 
The Court steamed along in unthreading “claim-processing” rules 
from subject matter jurisdiction in Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. 
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers.47 In Union Pacific, the Court 
decided whether it was proper for the National Railroad Adjustment 
Board, an arbitration panel, to dismiss employee claims for “lack of 
jurisdiction” because of a conferencing requirement during the pre-
arbitration internal grievance process.48 In the underlying case, a 
panel representative had raised on his own initiative that the record 
included no proof of conferencing and could not be supplemented 
because conferencing was a jurisdictional prerequisite to the panel’s 
exercise of authority as an “appellate tribunal.”49 The Court 
underscored that “the word ‘jurisdiction’ has been used by courts, 
including this Court, to convey many, too many, meanings . . . .”50 
The Court clarified that subject matter jurisdiction “refers to a 
tribunal’s power to hear a case” while a “claim-processing rule . . . 
does not reduce the adjudicatory domain of a tribunal.”51 The Court 
referred to a number of its decisions in which it held that procedural 
requirements, such as timeframes, were “nonjurisdictional and 
forfeitable” but “reaffirmed the jurisdictional character of the time 
limitation for filing a notice of appeal” to a court of appeals.52 After 
reviewing the conferencing requirement, the Court held that “nothing 
in the [Railway Labor Act] elevates to jurisdictional status the 
obligation to conference minor disputes or to prove conferencing.”53 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
  558 U.S. 67 (2009). 
! Id. at 71, 77. 
" Id. at 77-78. 
 Id. at 81 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 
(1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 Id. at 81 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 558 U.S. 67, 82 (2009). 
 Id. at 80. 
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C. Henderson v. Shinseki 
 
In Henderson v. Shinseki, the Court squarely addressed whether 
an administrative appeal had “jurisdictional consequences” and held 
that the 120-day filing deadline for an appeal to the United States 
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims was not jurisdictional.54 In so 
holding, the Court again disentangled “claim-processing rules” from 
jurisdiction, explaining that “[b]ecause the consequences that attach 
to the jurisdictional label may be so drastic, we have tried in recent 
cases to bring some discipline to the use of this term.”55 The Court 
emphasized as follows:  “Among the types of rules that should not be 
described as jurisdictional are what we have called ‘claim-processing 
rules.’ . . . Filing deadlines, such as the 120-day filing deadline at 
issue here, are quintessential claim-processing rules.”56 The Court 
further elaborated that “Congress is free to attach the conditions that 
go with the jurisdictional label to a rule that we would prefer to call a 
claim-processing rule.”57 Therefore, even though the Court did not 
consider procedural filing deadlines to be inherently tied to subject 
matter jurisdiction, the Court explained that it must look to “see if 
there is any ‘clear’ indication that Congress wanted the rule to be 
‘jurisdictional.’”58 The Henderson Court, in ascertaining Congress’ 
intent on whether the administrative deadline was meant to have 
“jurisdictional attributes,”59 distinguished a “century’s worth of 
precedent and practice in American courts”60 on jurisdictional 
appeals from one court to another court from, in this case, “review by 
an Article I tribunal as part of a unique administrative scheme.”61  
While the Supreme Court did not change the “jurisdictional 
character”62 of the time limitation for filing a notice of appeal for 
certain traditional appeals from one court to another, it did adopt a 
                                                            
 562 U.S. 428, 431 (2011). 
 Id. at 435. 
 Id. (emphasis added). 
  Id. 
! Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 436 (2011). 
" Id. at 438. 
 Id. at 436 (quoting Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 208 n.2 (2007)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 Id. at 438. 
 Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 558 U.S. 67, 82 (2009). 
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“bright line”63 for determining whether to classify statutory time 
limitations as jurisdictional: “quintessential claim-processing rules” 
are not jurisdictional unless clearly prescribed by Congress. In the 
following case, the Supreme Court delivered a unanimous decision 
that reiterated and applied this bright line to appeals to the 
Department of Health and Human Services’ Provider Reimbursement 
Review Board.64 
 
D. Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center 
 
In Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, Medicare 
providers had appealed an initial determination of reimbursement for 
inpatient services to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board 
more than ten years beyond the 180-day statutory deadline.65 The 
Court was asked to decide whether the filing deadline was 
jurisdictional and, if not, whether a “good cause” regulation 
extending the limitation up to three years was authorized under the 
governing statute and whether the doctrine of equitable tolling could 
be applied to this type of administrative appeal.66 The Court 
reiterated that it had adopted a “readily administrable bright line”67 
test to “ward off profligate use of the term ‘jurisdiction.’”68 In this 
test, a court inquires whether Congress has “clearly stated” that the 
time limitation is jurisdictional; in the absence of such a clear 
statement, courts should treat the filing deadline as 
nonjurisdictional.69 The Court highlighted “what it would mean were 
                                                            
 Henderson, 562 U.S. at 435 (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 
500, 516 (2006)). 
 Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817 (2013). 
 Id. at 821. 
 Id. 
  Id. at 824 (quoting Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 516) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
! Id. 
" Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 (2013). The Court 
further explained that “[t]his is not to say that Congress must incant magic words in 
order to speak clearly. We consider context, including this Court’s interpretations 
of similar provisions in many years past, as probative of whether Congress 
intended a particular provision to rank as jurisdictional.” Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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we to type the governing statute ‘jurisdictional’”70: “Not only could 
there be no equitable tolling. The Secretary’s regulation providing for 
a good-cause extension would fall as well.”71 The Court examined 
the congressional language and held that the time limitation was not 
jurisdictional and “does not bar the modest [good cause] extension 
contained in the Secretary’s regulation.”72 
The Court then addressed whether the doctrine of equitable 
tolling could be applied to the late appeals. The Court emphasized 
that equitable tolling would “gut” the good cause regulation that 
limited the extension to no later than three years after a Notice of 
Program Reimbursement was issued to the provider.73 While the 
Court had applied, in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs,74 a 
rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling to suits against the United 
States, the Court stated that “[t]his case is of a different order” and 
that the presumption had never been applied to an agency’s internal 
appeal deadline.75 Moreover, the Court noted that the statutory 
scheme at issue was not designed to be “unusually protective of 
claimants.”76 The Court ultimately held that equitable tolling did not 
apply to “administrative appeals of the kind here considered . . . .”77 
This line of Supreme Court cases clearly outlines that “administrative 
appeals of the kind here considered” are not tethered to the 
“mandatory and jurisdictional” time limitations in traditional appeals 
unless Congress has clearly stated that the time limitation is 
jurisdictional.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
  Id. at 824 (citation omitted). 
  Id. (citation omitted). 
  Id. at 826. 
  Id. at 826. 
  498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990). 
  Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 827 (2013). 
  Id. at 828 (quoting Bowen v. City of N.Y., 476 U.S. 467, 480 (1986)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
   Id. at 829. 
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IV. NATURE OF FILING DEADLINES FOR HEARING REQUESTS 
BEFORE STATE AGENCIES 
 
A. State Survey 
 
Some state courts have addressed the nature of filing deadlines 
for hearing requests before state agencies—often in cases prior to the 
recent line of Supreme Court cases—with mixed results that 
predominately favor adherence to jurisdictional time limitations.78 
For example, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina, in finding that 
a terminated employee filed a timely petition for a contested case 
hearing in the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), stated 
without further elaboration that “timely filing of a petition is 
necessary to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the agencies as well 
as the courts . . . .”79 The Court of Appeals of Washington also 
affixed jurisdictional time limitations to hearing requests before the 
OAH.80 However, the court clarified in a footnote that a late filing 
did not technically divest the OAH Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
of subject matter jurisdiction because the “legislature has granted 
ALJs subject matter jurisdiction to conduct administrative 
hearings.”81 Instead, the court explained, the ALJ cannot “exercise 
jurisdiction” when a party fails to timely request a hearing.82   
The Appellate Court of Illinois, in holding that the Educational 
Labor Relations Board did not have jurisdiction over an untimely 
filed unfair labor practice charge, examined its precedent indicating 
                                                            
 ! I conducted various searches in Lexis and Westlaw for state court cases 
addressing the nature of administrative time limitations. I could not find, unlike in 
the above surveys of the state reviewing courts and of the Supreme Court, a clear 
line of cases on administrative time limitations. While it was my intent to capture 
as many key cases as possible on the subject, I do not claim that the following 
discussion provides an exhaustive review of state court cases.   
 " Gray v. N.C. Dep’t of Env’t, 560 S.E.2d 394, 397 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); see 
also Little v. N.C. Dep’t of Env’t & Natural Res., No. COA09-441, 2010 N.C. 
App. LEXIS 1458, at *1 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2010) (holding that the Office of 
Administrative Hearings lacks subject matter jurisdiction when a contested case 
petition is untimely filed). 
! Pal v. Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 342 P.3d 1190 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2015). 
! Id. at 1197 n.6. 
! Id. 
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that “time limitations upon bringing actions before administrative 
agencies are matters of jurisdiction which cannot be tolled.”83 The 
court elaborated that a time limitation is jurisdictional “if the right 
being asserted is one unknown to the common law” because “the 
time limitation is an inherent element of the right and of the power of 
the tribunal to hear the matter.”84 Otherwise, the court explained, a 
time limitation is “merely a procedural matter” if it is based upon a 
common law right.85 Therefore, in Illinois, statutory time limits for 
administrative actions involving “new rights” are held to be 
jurisdictional.86  
The Texas Supreme Court held that a statutory time limit was a 
“prerequisite” to the Texas Workforce Commission’s jurisdiction 
over employment discrimination claims under the Texas Commission 
on Human Rights Act (TCHRA).87 The court detailed that while 
Congress expanded the Title VII limitations period under the Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, the Texas Legislature did not similarly 
amend the TCHRA.88 Because the court found that the TCHRA and 
Title VII “are no longer analogous,”89 it examined a Texas legislative 
amendment “mandat[ing] that all statutory prerequisites to suit are 
jurisdictional in suits against government entities”90 under statutory 
interpretation principles in order to determine “whether the 180-day 
filing deadline in the TCHRA [was] a statutory prerequisite to suit as 
contemplated by” the amendment.91 The court held that the 
timeframe was a statutory prerequisite and concluded that the 
claimant’s suit was jurisdictionally barred because it was untimely 
filed with the Commission.92  
The Superior Court of New Jersey also engaged in statutory 
analysis in order to determine whether the statutory deadline for a 
                                                            
! Charleston Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Ill. Educ. Labor Relations Bd., 
561 N.E.2d 331, 333, 335 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). 
! Id. at 333 (emphasis added). 
! Id. 
! Id. at 334. 
!  Prairie View A&M Univ. v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500, 503 (Tex. 2012). 
!! Id. at 506. 
!" Id. at 509. 
" Id. at 510. 
" Id. at 513. 
" Id. at 513-14. 
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license renewal application was “mandatory or directory.”93 The 
court explained that it had discerned two rationales in deciding 
whether a statutory deadline “for the public to seek relief from State 
agencies” was directory or mandatory94: the jurisdiction rationale95 
and the legislative scheme analysis.96 In concluding that the deadline 
was mandatory—and therefore could not be relaxed by the agency—
the court “scrutinize[d] the legislation at issue” because “[e]ven 
under the jurisdiction rationale” whatever the “Legislature intended 
controls the analysis.”97  
While variations of the “jurisdiction rationale” seem to prevail in 
the state courts, the Supreme Court of Connecticut requires “a strong 
showing of legislative intent that such a time limit is jurisdictional” 
and concluded that the 180-day filing deadline for a discrimination 
complaint before the Commission on Human Rights and 
Opportunities (Commission) was mandatory but not jurisdictional.98 
The court first highlighted, in explaining the court’s “presumption in 
favor of subject matter jurisdiction,” that subject matter jurisdiction 
“has very serious and final consequences.”99 The court then 
elaborated that in seeking to discern a “strong showing of legislative 
intent” for a subject matter jurisdictional time limitation, the court 
interprets the statute “according to well established principles of 
statutory construction.”100 As the court examined the intent of the 
                                                            
" Cavallaro 556 Valley St. Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 796 
A.2d 938, 940 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002). The court explained that if a 
“statutory time frame is mandatory, then modification or relaxation may be granted 
only by the Legislature” whereas if a “particular statutory deadline is only directory 
. . . then the agency would have authority to excuse the untimeliness.” Id. at 940-
41.  
" Id. at 941. 
" “The jurisdiction rationale, reflects the well known principle that 
administrative agencies derive all their powers from the Legislature.” Id. 
" The “legislative scheme analysis” “requires an analysis of the statutory 
scheme involved.” Id. at 941-42. 
"  Id. at 943-44. 
"! Williams v. Comm’n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 777 A.2d 645, 651, 
661 (Conn. 2001) (emphasis added). 
"" Id. at 651. 
 Id. at 651-53. The court explained that  
[i]n seeking to discern that [legislative] intent, we look to the words of the 
statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, 
 
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statute, it outlined a number of policy considerations “for declining to 
read the legislation as embodying the required strong showing of 
legislative intent to impose subject matter jurisdictional 
constraints.”101 For instance, the court stated that “[t]he audience of 
the provision . . . may not be fully aware of the necessity of filing 
within the statutory time periods, and may even fail to do so because 
of justifiable, equitable factors.”102 The court stated, moreover, that 
the Commission “routinely entertains untimely complaints when the 
parties present adequate reasons for the delay” and that “in 
appropriate circumstances entertaining untimely complaints serves 
those [public] interests.”103  
The court further concluded that although the time limitation was 
not jurisdictional, it was mandatory and “must be complied with, 
absent such factors as consent, waiver or equitable tolling.”104 The 
court elaborated that the mandatory time limitation did not operate 
like a “pure statute of limitations” because “[c]omplaints filed with 
the [C]ommission are not the same as actions filed in court.”105 The 
court, accenting the agency’s discretion, concluded that the 
Commission—not just a party as a special defense— may “raise the 
timeliness issue in conformity with its institutional responsibilities in 
the petition process.”106  
On the other hand, the District Court of Appeal of Florida simply 
stated that “the statutory deadline for requesting an administrative 
hearing is not jurisdictional.”107 The court addressed an “equitable 
argument” when an employee filed an employment discrimination 
                                                            
to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to 
existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject 
matter.  
Id. at 653. 
 Id. at 661. 
 Id. (footnote omitted). 
 Williams v. Comm’n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 777 A.2d 645, 
651 (Conn. 2001). 
 Id. at 661; but cf. Cavallaro, 796 A.2d at 940-41 (explaining that if a 
statutory time frame is mandatory, then modification or relaxation may be granted 
only by the Legislature). 
 Williams, 777 A.2d at 664. 
 Id. 
  Watson v. Brevard Cty. Clerk of the Circuit Ct., 937 So. 2d 1264, 1265 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (footnote omitted). 
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complaint one day after the deadline.108 The court explained that 
because the deadline was not jurisdictional, the “doctrine of equitable 
tolling [could] be applied to extend an administrative filing deadline” 
when a plaintiff “has been misl[ed] or lulled into action, has in some 
extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his rights, or has 
timely asserted his rights in the wrong forum.”109 The court found, 
however, that although an equitable argument could be asserted, 
“[n]one of these circumstances are applicable here.”110 
 
B. Analysis of Maryland’s Scheme 
 
Maryland’s appellate courts have not directly addressed the 
nature of filing deadlines in an administrative scheme, but the 
opinions suggest that a statutory timeframe would generally be 
construed as a condition precedent to the right of action but not as a 
condition precedent to the agency’s subject matter jurisdiction.111 A 
                                                            
! Id. 
" Id. (citing Machules v. Dep’t of Admin., 523 So. 2d 1132, 1134 (Fla. 
1988)). 
 Id. 
 See, e.g., Higginbotham v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 985 A.2d 1183, 1198 (Md. 
2009) (Harrell, J., concurring and dissenting) (“[W]here a statute containing a 
limitation period creates both the right and the remedy, the limitation period 
constitutes a condition precedent to maintaining suit, not merely a statute of 
limitations subject to waiver if not raised by the defendant as an affirmative 
defense.”); see also State ex rel. Stasciewicz v. Parks, 129 A. 793, 794 (Md. 1925) 
(“In most jurisdictions the courts have held that all the provisions of these statutes 
[that create a new cause of action], including that fixing the time within which the 
action must be brought, are essential to the maintenance of the suit.”).  
In a key case discussed in detail infra on the distinction between a statute of 
limitations and a condition precedent, State v. Sharafeldin, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland stated in a footnote, while discussing federal statutes similar to the State 
statute at issue, that  
[w]e need not complicate the issue by addressing it in terms of whether the 
defense is “jurisdictional” in nature. . . . The relevant focus is on whether the time 
limitation for bringing an action for breach of contract is a non-waivable, non-
tollable condition to the waiver of immunity. If it is and the condition is not met, an 
action against the State must be dismissed because the State remains immune from 
suit, not because the court is without jurisdiction. 
854 A.2d 1208, 1215 n.5 (Md. 2004) (emphasis added).  
In Engineering Management Services, Inc. v. Maryland State Highway 
Administration, a case decided by the Court of Appeals a year before Sharafeldin, 
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condition precedent operates in many respects like a jurisdictional 
bar and is non-waivable and non-tollable and can be raised at any 
time.112 A statute of limitations, on the other hand, is subject to 
waiver by the failure of a respondent to raise the defense in a proper 
manner, but it is not subject to discretionary extension.113 Equitable 
exceptions, such as tolling and estoppel,114 may also be available 
under a statute of limitations but these exceptions are narrow.115  
The Court of Appeals’ opinion in State v. Sharafeldin116 is a key 
opinion on the distinction between a statute of limitations and a 
condition precedent. The court addressed whether a statutory 
timeframe for breach of contract claims against the State 
“constitute[d] a condition to the waiver of sovereign immunity and 
thus to the right of action itself against the State or [was], instead, 
                                                            
the court “comment[ed] on” a “potentially erroneous” determination made by the 
Maryland State Board of Contract Appeals (Board) that it did not have jurisdiction 
to hear a contested case appeal on a procurement claim because the petition for a 
first level appeal was allegedly untimely (but not initially raised by the agency) and 
an “absolute” condition precedent to the Board’s subject matter jurisdiction. 825 
A.2d 966, 969, 981 (Md. 2003). The court concluded that the Board’s “analysis 
appears incorrect” and that “the statute of limitations in question here is not an 
issue of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 981, 985. The court further elaborated 
that “[s]imply because a statutory provision directs a court or an adjudicatory 
agency to decide a case in a particular way, if certain circumstances are shown, 
does not create an issue going to the court’s or agency’s subject matter 
jurisdiction.” Id. at 984.     
 See, e.g., Kearney v. Berger, 7 A.3d 593, 610 (Md. 2010) (“A condition 
precedent cannot be waived under the common law and a failure to satisfy it can be 
raised at any time because the action itself is fatally flawed if the condition is not 
satisfied.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Sharafeldin, 854 A.2d at 1215 n.5. 
 S.B. v. Anne Arundel Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 6 A.3d 329, 341 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 2010).   
 In Engineering Management, the court stated, in further explaining why the 
Board should not have dismissed the contractor’s claim on summary disposition, 
that  
[b]ecause a condition precedent can be met by estoppel, and estoppel is a 
factual matter which can be determined only upon a full hearing on the merits, it is 
inappropriate to view a statute [of limitations] which exists as a condition precedent 
to a claim in a summary judgment context to be a matter of subject matter 
jurisdiction to which issues of estoppel and waiver may not be considered [under 
Maryland administrative law].  
825 A.2d at 983 (emphasis added). 
 See, e.g., Elat v. Ngoubene, 993 F. Supp. 2d 497, 537-38 (D. Md. 2014). 
 854 A.2d 1208. 
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merely a statute of limitations.”117 The statutory provision provided 
that “[a] claim under this subtitle is barred unless the claimant files 
suit within 1 year . . . .”118 The court held that the filing deadline was 
not a statute of limitations but a condition to the action itself and that 
“[t]he waiver of the State’s immunity vanishes at the end of the one-
year period.”119  
In reaching its holding, the court emphasized that the “nature and 
effect” of the deadline was a “matter of statutory construction” and 
reviewed the statute for its legislative intent.120 The court stated:  
[I]n attempting to divine legislative intent, we look first to the 
words of the statute, but if the true legislative intent cannot readily be 
determined from the statutory language alone, we look to other 
indicia of the intent, including the title to the bill, the structure of the 
statute, the inter-relationship of its various provisions, its legislative 
history, its general purpose, and the relative rationality and legal 
effect of various competing constructions.121  
The court was concerned about construing the deadline as a 
“mere statute of limitations, waivable at will by State agencies or 
their respective attorneys,” as “limitations is an affirmative defense 
that can be waived and that is waived unless raised in the defendant’s 
answer.”122 The court highlighted the use of the term “barred” in the 
applicable statute and stated that “traditional statutes of limitations . . 
. normally state only that an action ‘shall be filed within’ the 
allowable period.”123 The court then explained that when “a 
limitation period is stipulated in a statute creating a cause of action it 
is not to be considered as an ordinary statute of limitations, but is to 
be considered as a limitation upon the right as well as the remedy” 
and concluded that the time limitation in the statute was a condition 
to the waiver of immunity and was not subject to waiver or tolling.124  
                                                            
  Id. at 1209. 
! Id. (emphasis added).   
" Id. at 1219.   
 Id. at 1212. 
 Id. at 1212-13 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 Id. at 1214 (emphasis in original).   
 Id.   
 Id. at 1218-19 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added); cf. 
Charleston Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Ill. Educ. Labor Relations Bd., 561 
N.E.2d 331, 333 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (explaining that a time limitation is 
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In Maryland, it is probably most apt to analyze filing timeframes 
for contested case hearings under a statute of limitations and 
condition precedent paradigm. In a Court of Special Appeals case 
prior to Sharafeldin, Maryland Securities Commissioner v. U.S. 
Securities Corp., the Appellant argued that the statute of limitations 
embodied in the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article did not 
apply to administrative actions for monetary fines or penalties.125 
The court agreed that the statute applied “only to judicial proceedings 
as opposed to administrative hearings”126 and explained its holding 
based upon the “spirit, reasoning, and holding” of its majority 
opinion in an earlier case, which stated that “an administrative 
hearing was not a ‘prosecution’ or ‘suit’ within the meaning of [the 
Courts and Judicial Article], and (2) the underlying purpose of 
protecting the public from unscrupulous practices by [professionals 
licensed by an agency] preempted the defense of limitations.”127  
While Maryland Securities Commissioner held that a specific 
statute of limitations in a judicial proceeding should not be exported 
to an administrative scheme, it did not directly stand for the 
proposition that a limitations period in an administrative scheme 
could not be interpreted as a statute of limitations. Moreover, in 
Engineering Management Services, Inc. v. Maryland State Highway 
Administration, a Court of Appeals case decided a year before 
Sharafeldin, the court “comment[ed] on” a “potentially erroneous” 
determination made by the Maryland State Board of Contract 
Appeals that it did not have jurisdiction to hear a contested case 
appeal on a procurement claim because the petition for a first level 
appeal was allegedly untimely (but not initially raised by the 
agency).128 The court concluded that the “administrative statute of 
limitations” pertinent to the agency’s appeal “is not an issue of 
subject matter jurisdiction.”129  
                                                            
jurisdictional “if the right being asserted is one unknown to the common law” 
because “the time limitation is an inherent element of the right and of the power of 
the tribunal to hear the matter.”).   
 716 A.2d 290, 298 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) (emphasis added). 
 Id.  
  Id. at 299. 
! 825 A.2d 966, 981 (Md. 2003). 
" Id. at 981, 984-85 (emphasis added). For a more detailed discussion of this 
case, see supra note 111. 
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V. HOW TO PROCEED? 
 
A. Statutory Construction 
 
The preceding sections illustrate the continued vitality of 
jurisdictional time limitations but also demonstrate that statutory 
filing deadlines are generally not an inherent element of subject 
matter jurisdiction.130 Instead, the consensus that emerges from my 
review of state and Supreme Court cases is that the legislature 
dictates whether a statutory filing timeframe is a jurisdictional 
prerequisite to an agency’s authority to hear a case. The Supreme 
Court is clear that in the federal landscape administrative filing 
deadlines are “quintessential claim-processing rules” but that 
“Congress is free” to attach the jurisdictional label.131 The Superior 
Court of New Jersey described what might be summarized as the 
“jurisdiction rationale” in the varied State landscape: whatever the 
“Legislature intended controls the analysis.”132  
Because of the harshness of jurisdictional deadlines, the 
adjudicating agency should determine whether there is any flexibility 
in the filing deadline. Unless a State’s appellate court is explicit that, 
for instance, the “timely filing of a petition is necessary to confer 
subject matter jurisdiction”133 on the adjudicating agency, the time 
limitation in the authorizing statute should be carefully reviewed for 
its legislative intent under principles of statutory construction. These 
principles for discerning legislative intent may be summarized as 
follows:  
                                                            
 See, e.g., Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfax Cty. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of 
Fairfax Cty., 626 S.E.2d 374, 379 (Va. 2006) (“[The] filing requirement set by the 
General Assembly does not define the class of cases, i.e. the subject matter 
jurisdiction, over which the circuit court has authority to adjudicate.”); but cf. 
Charleston Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Ill. Educ. Labor Relations Bd., 561 
N.E.2d 331, 333 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (explaining that a time limitation is 
jurisdictional “if the right being asserted is one unknown to the common law” 
because “the time limitation is an inherent element of the right and of the power of 
the tribunal to hear the matter.”).   
 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. 
 See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text. 
 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
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[W]e look first to the words of the statute, but if the true 
legislative intent cannot readily be determined from the statutory 
language alone, we look to other indicia of the intent, including the 
title to the bill, the structure of the statute, the inter-relationship of its 
various provisions, its legislative history, its general purpose, and the 
relative rationality and legal effect of various competing 
constructions.134  
    
B. Good Cause Provisions 
 
The Supreme Court highlighted that a good cause regulatory 
extension “would fall” under a jurisdictional time limitation.135 A 
legislature or regulatory body may expressly grant, however, a good 
cause exception to a non-jurisdictional filing timeframe.136 And any 
such good cause exception in a statute or regulation tends to support 
that the filing timeframe is not jurisdictional.137 Indeed, various state 
                                                            
 State v. Sharafeldin, 854 A.2d 1208, 1212-13 (Md. 2004) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Williams v. Comm’n on Human Rights & 
Opportunities, 777 A.2d 645, 653 (Conn. 2001) (stating that in “seeking to discern 
that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and 
circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed 
to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law 
principles governing the same general subject matter.”). 
 Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 (2013) (“We 
reiterate what it would mean were we to type the governing statute . . . 
‘jurisdictional.’ . . . Not only could there be no equitable tolling. The Secretary’s 
regulation providing for a good-cause extension would fall as well.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 In Maryland, the Court of Appeals analyzed whether there was good cause 
to extend the deadline for the filing of a proper certificate of qualified expert, 
which operated as a condition precedent to the claim. Although the court did not 
find good cause to extend the deadline, it highlighted the flexibility in the “deadline 
extension provision” provided by the statute, which served as an “escape valve[] 
for the harshness of the penalty . . . .” Kearney v. Berger, 7 A.3d 593, 612 (Md. 
2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
  A good cause exception in a statute would certainly support legislative 
intent for a non-jurisdictional timeframe. A good cause exception in the relevant 
agency regulations would also provide support that the filing timeframe is not 
jurisdictional, although the regulation could be felled by a court if it was found to 
be outside the scope of the enabling statute. See, e.g., Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 824; 
see generally JoAnne Sweeny, Filling in the Gaps: The Scope of Administrative 
Agencies’ Power to Enact Regulations, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 621 (2006). 
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agencies have provided good cause regulatory exceptions for 
untimely hearing requests. For example, under Oregon’s 
administrative rules for a “late request for hearing” in its employment 
department, the regulation provides as follows:  
“Good cause” exists when an action, delay, or failure to act arises 
from an excusable mistake or from factors beyond an applicant’s 
reasonable control. . . . The appellant shall set forth the reason(s) for 
filing a late request for hearing in a written statement, which the 
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) shall consider in 
determining whether good cause exists for the late filing, and 
whether the request was filed within a reasonable time.138 
Other states, such as California, Connecticut, and Michigan, have 
also enacted regulatory provisions providing for good cause 
extensions to certain late filings.139 While these extensions provide 
for flexibility in the filing deadline, the adjudicating agency should 
apply these exceptions carefully in order to avoid arbitrary or 
capricious decisions.140 
 
 
                                                            
! OR. ADMIN. R. 471-040-0010(1), (4). 
" CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 599.904(c) (“Except as otherwise limited by 
statute or case law, the Department of Personnel Administration or the Director 
may allow such an appeal to be filed within 30 days after the end of the period in 
which the appeal should have been filed if the petitioner demonstrates good cause 
for a late filing.”); CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 17a-451(t)-5(a) (“[A] grievance shall 
be filed not later than forty-five calendar days after the receipt of notice of the 
action complained of, unless good cause is shown for a late filing, as determined by 
the client rights officer.”); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 451.2601 (“If a pleading or other 
paper is not filed in accordance with applicable time limits, the right of a party to 
make that filing is waived. The administrator in its discretion may, upon a showing 
of good cause for the late filing, permit the late filing of a pleading or other 
paper.”).  
 See, e.g., 1 M.L.E. What Constitutes an Improper Delegation of Power § 4 
(2009) (“A statute or ordinance placing discretionary power in an administrative 
agency must furnish standards for those who administer such power in order to 
avoid arbitrary decisions . . . .”); Falcone v. O’Connor, 986 N.Y.S.2d 265, 266 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (“[The licensing official] did not abuse her discretion in 
denying petitioner’s application . . . . [The] official is vested with considerable 
discretion in ruling on a permit application and may deny it for any good cause. 
This Court will not disturb such a determination unless it is arbitrary or capricious.” 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
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C. Accardi Doctrine 
 
Under the Accardi Doctrine, named for the United States 
Supreme Court case United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy,141 
administrative agencies must generally follow their own rules and 
regulations.142 While Accardi “involved much more than mere 
technical violations of an internal agency regulation pertaining to the 
orderly transaction of agency business,” subsequent Supreme Court 
cases have limited the Doctrine by providing an exemption for 
“agency housekeeping regulations” unless a violation of such 
regulations causes substantial prejudice.143 As discussed earlier in 
this Article, an agency cannot waive a jurisdictional deadline or a 
time limitation that is a condition precedent.144 Moreover, an agency 
does not have discretion to waive a statute of limitations on the basis 
of good cause.145 If a timeframe is read to be a “claim-processing” 
rule that does not operate like a “pure statute of limitations,” 
however, then an adjudicating agency might arguably waive it under 
                                                            
 347 U.S. 260 (1954). 
 Pollock v. Patuxent Inst. Bd. of Review, 823 A.2d 626, 639-40 (Md. 2003); 
see also ROCHVARG, supra note 1, § 22.2, at 272-73. 
 See Pollock, 823 A.2d at 637-38.  
 See discussion supra Part II, IV.B.  
 See, e.g., S.B. v. Anne Arundel Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 6 A.3d 329, 341 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (“[T]he deadline [for judicial review] has consistently 
been treated as an absolute statute of limitations, subject to waiver by failure of a 
respondent to raise the defense in a proper manner but not subject to discretionary 
extension. . . . The Court of Appeals has explained that it deliberately changed the 
former rule governing judicial review of administrative agency decision, by 
eliminating judicial authority to extend the filing period for good cause.” (emphasis 
added)); Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. v. Neal, 864 A.2d 287, 294 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 2004) (“In Colao we recognized that rule 7-203, which governs the 
time for filing a petition for judicial review, does not confer discretion on the 
circuit court to accept an untimely filed petition, and therefore operates as a statute 
of limitations.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).  
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the Accardi exception.146 Yet, the waiver may be vacated if prejudice 
is shown.147  
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire was directly confronted 
with the issue of whether an administrative board should have waived 
the filing deadline for a petitioner’s untimely appeal because the 
agency had not met several of its time limitations.148 The court first 
noted that the petitioner had not raised any objections to—or availed 
himself of any remedies for—the agency’s tardiness throughout the 
appeal process.149 The court then highlighted that under the State’s 
Administrative Procedure Act, agencies must follow their own rules 
and regulations and concluded that it was proper for the 
Administrative Board to dismiss the untimely appeal.150 In light of 
the Accardi Doctrine—coupled with the murky nature of 
administrative filing timeframes—an adjudicating agency should not 
generally exercise its discretion in waiving the filing deadline for a 
late hearing request unless a good cause exception is expressly 
granted in the statute or regulation.  
 
D. Maryland’s Medical Assistance Case Study 
 
Medical Assistance (MA) is provided through Maryland’s 
participation in the federal Medicaid program.151 Under Maryland’s 
MA program, an appellant must request an MA fair hearing within 
ninety days of the receipt of the notification of eligibility or of 
                                                            
 Williams v. Comm’n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 777 A.2d 645, 
664 (Conn. 2001) (stating that the administrative time limitation did not operate 
like a “pure statute of limitations” and accenting the agency’s discretion to raise the 
timeliness issue “sua sponte”). 
  See, e.g., Pollock, 823 A.2d at 630, 650 (adopting a “modif[ied]” Accardi 
Doctrine for administrative hearings in Maryland and holding that “a complainant 
must . . . show prejudice to have the agency action invalidated”). 
! In re Murdock, 943 A.2d 757, 763 (N.H. 2008). 
" Id. at 764. 
 Id. 
 See What Is Medicaid?, DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, 
https://mmcp.dhmh.maryland.gov/pages/Medicaid-Medical-Assistance-
Overview.aspx  (Jan. 5, 2015) (stating that “[e]ach state establishes its own 
eligibility standards, benefits package, provider requirements, payment rates, and 
program administration under broad federal guidelines). 
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services provided or denied.152 The ninety-day timeframe is codified 
in both the state and federal regulations rather than in the authorizing 
statutes, and neither regulation specifically mandates that the filing 
deadline is jurisdictional.153 There is no good cause exception 
expressly granted in the statutes or regulations. In order to determine 
the nature of the filing timeframe, the principles outlined in the 
preceding sections of this Article may be applied. 
Under Supreme Court precedent, the federal filing deadline is a 
“quintessential claim-processing rule” that is not jurisdictional unless 
“clearly stated” by Congress.154 In Sebelius v. Auburn Regional 
Medical Center, where the Court was asked to decide whether the 
filing deadline for Medicare providers was jurisdictional, the Court 
examined the congressional language and held that the time 
limitation was not jurisdictional.155 The Sebelius Court, however, did 
not specifically examine the regulation at issue here. Moreover, the 
limitation period at issue is under a state plan administered by 
Maryland’s Department of Health and Mental Hygiene rather than 
directly administered through the federal government.   
In accordance with the Medicaid program, Maryland’s limitation 
period must comply with federally mandated standards and the due 
process opportunity to be heard.156 Maryland’s appellate courts have 
construed statutory time limitations more strictly than the Supreme 
Court157 and have applied the rules of statutory construction to 
                                                            
 MD. CODE REGS. 10.01.16.04; see also 42 C.F.R. § 431.221(d) (2014). 
 MD. CODE REGS. 10.01.16.04. 
 See supra Part III. 
 Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 821 (2013). 
 See MD. CODE REGS. 10.09.24.16 (“Except if the language of a specific 
regulation indicates an intent by the Department [of Health and Mental Hygiene] to 
provide reimbursement for covered services to [MA] Program recipients without 
regard to the availability of federal financial participation, State regulations shall be 
interpreted in conformity with applicable federal statutes and regulations.”); see 
also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970) (setting forth due process 
standards in the termination of “statutory entitlements” and reiterating that the 
“fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard”); 
Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 314 (4th Cir. 2013) (stating that “[i]f a state 
participates in Medicaid, it must comply with federally mandated standards”).  
  See Ferguson v. Loder, 975 A.2d 284, 294-95 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009) 
(“[T]he Court of Appeals of Maryland declined to follow [the Supreme Court in] 
Irwin with respect to conditions precedent under Maryland law. . . . Thus, 
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determine whether a time limitation for bringing an action operates as 
a statute of limitations—which may be waived under certain 
conditions—or as a condition precedent to the action—which is non-
waivable and can be raised at any time because the action itself is 
“fatally flawed if the condition is not satisfied.”158 In harmonizing the 
state and federal filing deadlines, Schreur v. Department of Human 
Services159 and State v. Sharafeldin160 are instructive. 
In Schreur, the Michigan Court of Appeals reviewed federal 
Medicaid law when the Appellant filed a request for a fair hearing 
368 days after the date of the notice and 278 days after the expiration 
of the 90 day period.161 The Court of Appeals did not specifically 
address whether the time limitation was in the nature of a statute of 
limitations or jurisdictional but did address whether the time period 
should be “tolled” because the denial notice “contained incorrect 
citations to the” administrative regulations.162 While the Court 
distinguished between an applicant and a recipient—which is not a 
relevant factor in either the Maryland regulations or in the Michigan 
Supreme Court’s judgment—Schreur’s tolling analysis suggested 
that the timeframe was a more flexible statute of limitations.  
In addition to Schreur, a number of courts have characterized 
various appeal timeframes that are worded similarly to the federal 
Medicaid regulation—although outside of medical assistance and 
sometimes in the context of a traditional suit—as a statute of 
limitations.163 Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, the filing 
deadline is codified in the federal regulations rather than in the 
                                                            
Sharafeldin established a bright line between the treatment of conditions precedent 
under Maryland law, and the more liberal treatment of jurisdictional requirements 
under the FTCA and similar statutes by recent federal court decisions.”). 
! See, e.g., Kearney v. Berger, 7 A.3d 593, 610 (Md. 2010); State v. 
Sharafeldin, 854 A.2d 1208, 1212-13 (Md. 2004). 
" 795 N.W.2d 192 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 795 
N.W.2d 124 (Mich. 2011). 
 854 A.2d 1208 (Md. 2004). 
 Schreur, 795 N.W.2d at 195. 
 Id. at 195-96.   
 See, e.g., Savina v. Litton Indus., 330 N.W.2d 456, 457; (Minn. 1983); 
Wilson v. Shannon, 386 S.E.2d 257, 258 (S.C. 1989); Johnston v. Bowen, 437 
S.E.2d 45, 64 (S.C. 1993); McDougal v. Weed, 945 P.2d 175, 176-77 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997); Roemhildt v. Gresser Co., Inc., 729 N.W.2d 289, 293 (Minn. 2007).   
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authorizing statute. This congressional silence is far from a clear 
legislative statement of jurisdictional intent.164 
In Sharafeldin, which concerned a waiver of sovereign immunity 
rather than a “statutory entitlement,” the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland highlighted the use of the term “barred” in the applicable 
statute and stated that “traditional statutes of limitations . . . normally 
state only that an action ‘shall be filed within’ the allowable 
period.”165 Indeed, Maryland’s MA regulation states that the request 
for a fair hearing should be filed “within 90 days of the receipt of the 
notification.”166 In light of the plain language of the limitation 
period—and its placement in the regulation rather than in the 
authorizing statute—the time limitation does not appear to be a 
condition precedent to the right of action itself. The nature of the MA 
filing deadline can most likely be characterized in harmony with 
federal standards as an “administrative statute of limitations” that is 
not an unwaivable condition precedent to the administrative right and 
remedy.   
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
As the Supreme Court and some state courts have highlighted, 
jurisdictional deadlines are “drastic,” “serious,” and “final.”  For over 
a decade the Supreme Court has reigned in the “more than 
occasional” misuse of the term “jurisdictional” to describe “emphatic 
time prescriptions.”167 The perhaps reflexive reaction that a filing 
deadline is inextricably intertwined with subject matter jurisdiction is 
generally not supported outside of traditional appeals from one court 
to another. Instead, the thread through the patchwork of state cases is 
that the Legislature dictates whether a statutory filing timeframe is a 
jurisdictional prerequisite to an agency’s authority to hear a case. The 
adjudicating agency should, therefore, carefully parse the relevant 
                                                            
 See Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 (2013) 
(explaining that “[t]his is not to say that Congress must incant magic words in order 
to speak clearly” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 Sharafeldin, 854 A.2d at 1214. 
 MD. CODE REGS. 10.01.04.04D.   
  Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 413 (2004) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 
 " 		 97
agency statute and regulations for any flexibility in the filing 
deadline, including any express good cause exceptions.  
The sparse and often contradictory analyses among the states on a 
rather fundamental aspect of administrative law—the nature of a 
filing deadline for a contested case hearing—is troubling. An 
adjudicating agency is often without guidance, which fosters 
inefficiency and unfairness. Although a time limitation should not 
stretch indefinitely, flexible due process should also not support an 
unduly harsh deadline that may be overbroad and which may not 
serve the public interest.168 While I have striven to bring some 
cohesiveness to this area, I urge the states to visit—or revisit—this 
subject and to follow the example of the Supreme Court in providing 
greater clarity and uniformity in the area of administrative filing 
guidelines.  
 
                                                            
! But see Poor, supra note 5, at 151-52 (“[P]ractical experience teaches that 
the judicial system as a whole works far better—with greater stability and overall 
fairness—when the time for an appeal cannot be manipulated by the parties or 
overridden by the trial court and thus is treated as jurisdictional.”). 
